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EDITOR'S PREFACE
The following four articles were prepared in anticipation of the
Twelfth Annual Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law, which was to have been held at the Syracuse University College of Law on April 5, 1975. Unfortunately, a paralyzing
snowstorm on the weekend of the meeting forced a cancellation of
the proceedings.
The four papers published in this issue outline the proposed
discussion. The remarks of Mr. Sassoon were prepared as an introduction to a session on the necessary role of international financial
institutions, while the article by Dean Alnasrawi which follows was
scheduled as the keynote, presenting his overview of the petrodollar
problem. Professor Pattillo, originally scheduled as a member of the
panel discussing petromoney investment problems in the United
States and elsewhere, subsequently submitted an analysis of balance of payments problems generated by the new petrofunds. Completing this section is the presentation scheduled to open the afternoon session, an analysis by Professor Herzog of the response of the
"European Community" to the petromoney imbalance. The economic analyses of these articles, especially those of Mr. Sassoon and
Dean Alnasrawi, are based upon data available at the time of conference.
The College of Law International Law Society would like to
express its appreciation to those persons yet unmentioned who had
graciously agreed to attend the Twelfth Annual Regional Meeting:
Associate Professor Jon E. Bischel; Pierre De Ravel D'Esclapon,
Esq.; James G. Evans, Jr., Esq.; Associate Professor George M.
Frankfurter; Professor L.F.E. Goldie; Assistant Professor Douglass
J. Klein; Professor Eric Lawson; Howard Mennell, Esq.; Lester
Nurick, Esq.; and James E. Price, Esq.
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PETRODOLLARS-THE RECYCLING PROBLEM:
SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
David M. Sassoon*
Whatever the actual size and volume of surplus funds that
ultimately accrue to the oil producing countries as a result of the
quadrupling of oil prices in late 1973 and early 197 4, there is no
doubt that a dramatic and unprecedented shift in financial resources from the oil importing to the oil exporting countries has
occurred. This trend will continue for at least the immediate future
and probably will not reverse before the end of this decade, when
new or alternative energy sources and changes in consumption patterns may begin to show their effects. To be sure, early forecasts on
the implications of the oil revolution painted a bleak prospect for
the world at large, and particularly for the industrial world. It is
now, however, generally accepted that the estimates of amounts involved were exaggerated by many in the early crisis days, and have
more recently been revised downward. These new and more modest
estimates are the result of various factors.
First, reduced demand has precipitated a substantial worldwide decrease in the consumption of Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil. Overall production is reported to be down some 20 percent from 30 million to 25 million
barrels a day, and in some countries, notably Saudi Arabia, the
reduction is even more massive. Even further declines are forecast
as a result of warmer weather and increased supplies from nonOPEC sources. In some instances, this reduction is apparently leading to lower prices for OPEC's crude oil (agreements to maintain
price notwithstanding) and to sales on credit, which have the same
effect. Witness the volte face in U.S. policy, which is now directed
at obtaining an agreement on a minimum or floor price for oil, but
which was originally directed at an all-out effort to reduce prices
when the successive price hikes were first announced. Also indicative is the February 1975 surplus in the U.S. balance of trade due
to a huge decline in the oil import bill.
Second, the OPEC nations have experienced unexpectedly
large import costs, both in the magnitude or quantity of goods purchased or on order and in price terms, the latter because the original
surplus estimates apparently ignored the escalation in costs for imported goods to the producing countries.
* Attorney, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, D.C .;
Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center.
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Both of these factors have helped to reduce payment deficits in
the industrial countries, virtually all of which have shown constant
(and sometimes dramatic) improvement over the past several
months. Quite apart from the various blessings in disguise that
commentators now associate with the situation and the accelerated
recession related thereto (for example, conservation efforts, an impetus to self-sufficiency in energy and in other resources, the antiinflationary effects of the recession, etc.), the problem appears less
severe and more manageable than it was assumed when the first
dire estimates, predictions, and alarms of impending disaster were
sounded.
The question which should be addressed, in my opinion, can be
stated as follows: how do we best deal with the effect of the massive
growth of funds that the small group of OPEC countries has attained and will most likely continue to accumulate? In other words,
how do we ensure that the enormous growth in OPEC purchasing
power will be handled in a manner least likely to disrupt the monetary and economic order of the world community at large?
Before attempting even a brief analysis of the problem and of
some of the possible answers, two preliminary observations should
be noted. First, the solution to this problem is of equal concern to
all countries. Producers and consumers alike share a real interest in
maintaining a world monetary and economic order and in preventing a chaotic situation which would only be detrimental to all.
Herein lies the realpolitik notion that, notwithstanding preoccupations regarding the short term effects of the energy crisis (for example, issues relating to balance of payments deficits, the serious impact on the poorest countries, or the political and other implications
associated with embargo, discrimination, and boycott policies),
there exists, in the final analysis, a mutual interest between producers and consumers in solving the problems through cooperation
rather than confrontation. Put in different terms, there is a growing
recognition of the communality of interest in a longer term point of
view. While the industrial world needs energy, the producing states
need reliable sources of revenue for development to produce higher
and improved standards of living, to expand and maintain growing
and diversifying economies (toward the day when petroleum resources are depleted), and to establish more progressive and modern
social infrastructures through the provision of health, education,
welfare, and similar facilities or services which are still, at most,
only marginally available in many of the oil exporting countries.
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The second preliminary observation that ought to be made concerns
the relation of the immediate problem under consideration to other
problems which clearly are related to it. Most, if not all, of these
other problems actually predate the explosion in oil prices. They
include, for example, the increasing difficulty of the traditional
banking channels to manage aggregate fund flows, galloping rates
of inflation, high interest rates, and unstable exchange rates. All of
these "hardships" were in existence before the final quarter of 1973
and were only aggravated by OPEC oil pricing policies. The strain
on the private banking system and the collapse of certain large
banks (Herstatt, Franklin National, etc.)., though occurring last
summer and preceded by the collapse of some 20 smaller banks all
over the world , seem to have resulted more from the e·arlier
disturbances mentioned than from the energy crisis itself. Therefore, the problem which concerns us is the means by which a mutually acceptable machinery, one that will not endanger the stability of the financial system of the free world, can be devised. If
international cooperation is the suggested remedy to this sudden
transfer of wealth, then ignoring for the moment the shift in political
power, the questions are: what are we to cooperate about, what
shape ought this cooperation take, and how should this cooperation
manifest itself?
Until 1974, it was generally accepted that the world's capital
markets could combine to function effectively and flexibly in accepting and recycling capital flows. Since 1974, however, the concurrence of high oil prices, higher inflation, and recession in the
industrial world has called this ability of the system into question,
and has generated interest in developing recycling mechanisms
which would replace or function in parallel with the traditional
capital markets. I have mentioned the problems of inflation and
recession in this context only because they have a direct bearing on
the question under discussion. Under conditions of recession it becomes prohibitively expensive for industry to raise equity capital,
while under conditions of inflation (calling for a monetary response
through high interest rates) it becomes very costly to obtain debt
capital. This combination of circumstances (that may now be
changing, but which prevailed during the height of the energy crisis)
is as bad for the oil or capital exporter who looks for security of
investment as it is for the oil or capital importer. Because it was no
longer possible for the traditional capital markets to borrow on short
terms (as seems to have been the initial clear preference of the
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managers of OPEC funds) and to lend long in the amounts available, growing amounts of surplus funds began being absorbed by
governments through the issue of short term obligations, thereby
causing the governments to assume a role hitherto reserved for the
private banking sector. With the simultaneous intervention of central banks in support of weaker banks in several of the industrial
countries, governments were in effect playing an unprecedented and
decisive role on both sides of capitalism's balance sheet, which they
can expect to continue to do for some time to come. Thus, the first
significant consequence of the recycling problem is the larger role
that the central banks of the industrial countries have assumed in
what used to be known as the private capital markets of the world.
To this development add the following considerations: a growing volume of direct government-to-government transactions (that
is, direct borrowings by industrial and developing countries from
OPEC countries); ·direct placing of oil money with borrowers by
using the private banks as intermediary brokers only, rather than
as direct depositories of funds (for example, the recent South of
Scotland Electricity Board $100 million and the British Shell Corporation $200 million loans); the diversification of currencies (adding marks, Swiss francs, and guilders to dollars and sterling, the
traditional oil currencies) in which oil surplus funds are being held;
the direction of funds to deficit countries through the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank), the International Development
Association, and their traditional lending channels and through the
three regional development banks (the Inter-American, Asian, and
African Development Banks), and existing and newly created multilateral and bilateral development lending institutions of OPEC
countries, as well as through the United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Capital Development Fund, and the
United Nations Emergency Operation machinery; and the closing
of some of the traditional triangular capital markets or currency
protection havens (by measures such as the penalties the Swiss
recently imposed) to oil money.
By contemplation of all these factors, one gets a clearer idea of
some of the recycling forces already at play. Even though these
processes have been described in banking circles as of "great significance," it is not suggested that the problem is unmanageable. Quite
the contrary, emergence of these processes indicates how versatile
the system really is, in that it was strong or flexible enough to cope
with the situation as it developed. Given certain adjustments and
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modifications, it was able to absorb the OPEC surplus without serious dislocations, even in a period ofrecession when private demand
for capital was extremely low and unemployment in many industrial countries, including the United States, reached levels exceeded only in the Great Depression of the 1930's. Far from producing a disaster, the redistribution of petrodollars during 1974 may in
fact be considered a success story. To be sure, the foregoing recycling mechanisms, plus the traditional investment channels (equity
participation or purchase of other assets or property in the industrial world), may seem unsatisfactory to the oil producing countries because of their wish to eliminate or reduce the risks of default,
currency depreciation, and even expropriation of assets, about
which they exhibit growing apprehension. But these are the traditional risks associated with international capital transfers and
flows, and there really is, in my opinion, no compelling reason why
a special effort for ameliorating these risks ought to be mounted and
new schemes devised for the special purpose of protecting oil exporters where others have had to accept exposure to them for so long.
There is little doubt that the most serious victims of the energy
crisis have been the poorest countries. They have suffered the real
brunt of the oil price rise and have been the hardest hit through a
deterioration in their terms of trade caused by the enormous increase in oil prices and the economic recession in the industrial
world. Although they have benefited to some extent from the recent
rapid inflation, which has reduced the burden of their foreign debt
to some extent, their overall capital needs and the cost of their
development plans have increased appreciably. There is little doubt
that the Third World has and will continue to pay the highest price
in terms of widespread human suffering and misery for the energy
crisis. The international organizations whose task it is to assist
these countries (in particular the World Bank, and to some extent
the IMF) have traditionally acted as cooperative institutions providing recycling mechanisms for the transfer of capital from surplus
to deficit countries. The World Bank has over the past 25 years borrowed increasing amounts of money in surplus or capital exporting
countries, relending the borrowed funds to the developing or capital
importing countries. Drawings under traditional IMF facilities are
of a similar nature. They are designed to enable the needy to utilize
the resources of those countries that have something to spare. Most
surplus oil funds could easily be recycled through these cooperative
institutions.

Published by SURFACE, 1975

7

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1975], Art. 4

368

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 3:363

As international institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund clearly provide the framework for cooperation; they are in a positidn to extend the technical know-how and
assistance (the institution-building experience of World Bank projects) which the oil producing countries so urgently need in order to
translate their new wealth into modern technology, and to provide
a base for further growth in the future. The Bank and the Fund can
borrow from the oil exporters and lend to the poor, who would then
use the funds to purchase from the industrial nations the goods and
services required for their development. The Bank and the Fund are
in a position to provide security for the repayment of borrowed oil
funds and to assume the risk of default of their own borrowers, for
that is the manner in which they have operated in the past. Finally,
they can best (on the basis of their vast and successful experience
in development) ensure that the oil earnings are invested in the
most economic and efficient projects, and so in large measure fulfill
the needs and expectations of all.
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